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There is evidence that neural patterns are predictive of voluntary decisions, but findings
come from paradigms that have typically required participants to make arbitrary choices
decisions in highly abstract experimental tasks. It remains to be seen whether proactive
neural activity reflects upcoming choices for individuals performing decisions in more
complex, dynamic, scenarios. In this functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
study, we investigated proactive neural activity for voluntary decisions compared with
instructed decisions in a virtual environment, which more closely mimicked a real-world
decision. Using partial least squares (PLS) analysis, we found that the frontoparietal
and salience networks were associated with voluntary choice selection from a time
at which decisions were abstract and preceded external stimuli. Using multi-voxel
pattern analysis (MVPA), we showed that participants’ choices, which were decodable
from motor and visual cortices, could be predicted with lower accuracy for voluntary
decisions than for instructed decisions. This corresponded to eye-tracking data showing
that participants made a greater number of fixations to alternative options during
voluntary choices, which might have resulted in less stable choice representations.
These findings suggest that voluntary decisions engage proactive choice selection, and
that upcoming choices are encoded in neural representations even while individuals
continue to consider their options in the environment.
Keywords: free choice, self-initiated decision, action selection, partial least squares, multi-voxel pattern analysis,
eye-tracking
INTRODUCTION
Voluntary, or free, decisions are defined by the ability to select an option from amongst a
number of available alternatives (Haggard, 2005; Thimm et al., 2012). Typically, voluntary
decisions have been contrasted with instructed decisions at the time the decision is made,
emphasizing differences in self-initiating a response (Cunnington et al., 2002; Rowe et al.,
2005; Forstmann et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2008; Dominguez et al., 2011; Krieghoff et al.,
2011; Thimm et al., 2012). However, decision-making is increasingly viewed as a proactive
process in which neural activity prior to the decision execution corresponds to preparation
of the upcoming choice (Friston, 2010; Pezzulo and Ognibene, 2012). Previous studies have
shown the ability to predict voluntary choices in highly simplified contexts, for example
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making decisions between left and right buttons without any
environment in which these decisions would have an effect (e.g.,
Soon et al., 2008; Bode et al., 2011), between abstract decision
to add or subtract two numbers without any consequence (e.g.,
Soon et al., 2013), or between object categories that again lacked
any context to give these decisions any meaning (e.g., Bode et al.,
2013). It is unknown, however, what processes underlie voluntary
decisions in more complex, ecologically-valid environments,
which require an ongoing, proactive commitment to an initially
formed intention.
Studies investigating brain responses in the pre-decision
period have found patterns of neural activity representing the
upcoming choice, particularly when the choice is freely prepared
(Libet, 1985; Soon et al., 2008, 2013; Bode et al., 2011; Leotti
and Delgado, 2011). When participants were presented with
random monetary gains, Leotti and Delgado (2011) found that
reward circuitry was recruited in anticipation of a voluntary color
choice but not preceding a forced choice. Predictive encoding
of voluntary decisions has also been evident in areas of the
sensory cortex (Kostelecki et al., 2012), frontopolar cortex and
medial prefrontal cortex (Soon et al., 2008) when individuals
chose randomly between left or right button presses (Soon
et al., 2008; Kostelecki et al., 2012), or decided whether to
add or subtract two numbers (Haynes et al., 2007; Soon et al.,
2013). Furthermore, it was found that frontopolar cortex activity
represented the content of simple decisions only if participants
had the intention to voluntarily decide between two arbitrary
options, but not if they believed themselves to be guessing
(Bode et al., 2013). These studies suggest that voluntary decisions
involve more proactive processes than instructed decisions,
potentially recruiting different neural networks, depending on
the nature of the decision.
Another noteworthy feature of previous studies that impacts
their generalisability is that these studies have predominantly
relied on participants making arbitrary choices, which were
substantially removed from real-world situations. One side effect
of this type of experimental design is that participants might
have started producing relatively predictable sequences (Lages
and Jaworska, 2012; Lages et al., 2013; Soon et al., 2014). In
addition, some authors have argued that choices in some of these
experiments barely qualify as true free decisions because they are
irrelevant (Batthyany, 2009). In line with this reasoning, it has
been argued that voluntary decisions should allow the freedom to
choose between options ‘‘because of a desire, goal or preference’’
(Schall, 2001). This means there is a need for more ecological
contexts in which measures can provide detail about the dynamic
evolution of decision states (Smilek et al., 2006; Kingstone et al.,
2008; Song and Nakayama, 2009; Pezzulo and Ognibene, 2012).
In such scenarios, decisions can be conceptualized as more
dynamic processes, rather than as single events in time. Hence,
voluntary decisions might also be prone to change, because other
choice options continue to be available.
Evidence of greater engagement of the frontoparietal network
for voluntary decisions, irrespective of modality, has led some
authors to propose this to be a higher order free decision network
(Rowe et al., 2005; Thimm et al., 2012). The frontoparietal
network is considered an attentional control network that
extends across frontal and parietal cortices, including the
anterior and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) and inferior parietal lobes (IPL; Vincent et al.,
2008). Regions of this network have been commonly found
to be more involved when people make free decisions than
instructed decisions (Lau et al., 2004b; Coricelli et al., 2005;
Rowe et al., 2005; Leotti and Delgado, 2011; Thimm et al., 2012).
However, these studies have only reported activity at the time
of response, when action selection is underway and there are
demands on visual attention, which is also known to recruit the
frontoparietal network (Scolari et al., 2015). In the context of a
dynamic decision environment, it may be that regions for choice
selection are proactively recruited during the entire decision
period, leading up to the execution of the chosen option, while
participants still engage with available choice options.
In order to investigate the proactive preparation of voluntary
decisions, we created a novel decision-making paradigm in
a virtual environment that was performed during functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). At the beginning of each
trial, participants were asked to choose between three different
colored doors at the end of a corridor, behind which they could
find randomly hidden stars (functioning as reward cues). The
stars solely provided motivation, as most real-world behavior
involves some kind of reward, but participants were instructed
that stars appeared randomly and no strategy was required. In
the Instructed condition, participants were told the color of the
door to choose, while in the Voluntary condition participants
could freely choose between the colored doors. Participants then
‘‘walked’’ along the virtual corridor and selected their chosen
door when they reached the end. We analyzed the period of
time leading up to decision execution, conceptualizing the entire
period as a dynamic decision with phases of choice selection and
motor preparation.
Crucially, the doors were not visible when making the initial
choice, as the location of each colored door only became visible
at the halfway point in the corridor. Therefore, there could be
no spatial attention or motor preparation differences between
the different option doors during this initial phase of the trial.
We predicted that activation of the frontoparietal network during
the initial period would support its purported role in free choice
selection. We also investigated whether we could decode the
specific representation of the color door of choice. The second
phase of the trial revealed the position of the colored doors
and allowed participants to visually attend to their choices and
begin specific motor preparation. This allowed us to decode the
motor choice and, in addition, to investigate visual attention to
the choices using eye-tracking. With this approach, we aimed to
identify and explain differences in the representations of choice
plans during proactive preparation of voluntary and instructed
decisions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-seven participants were recruited after providing written
informed consent. All participants were right-handed, had
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normal or corrected to normal vision and no history of
psychiatric or neurological trauma or disorder. Five participants
were excluded due to excessive head movement. Data from the
remaining 22 participants were used in the analyses (15 female,
mean age 23 years, range 20–29 years). Participants were
compensated monetarily for their time. This study was carried
out in accordance with the recommendations of the National
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research, NHMRC
Australia with written informed consent from all subjects.
All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved
by the University of Queensland Medical Research Ethics
Committee.
Experimental Task
Participants underwent a brief training session with instructions
outside the scanner prior to completing the experimental task
in the 3T MRI scanner. The task was based in a simple virtual
environment, presented through Psychtoolbox on MATLAB
(MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, USA). The paradigm is shown
in Figure 1. The virtual environment was used to create a
dynamic task where participants were actively engaged in the
epoch leading up to their decision execution. Participants viewed
rendered images of the three-dimensional corridor with a first-
person perspective from their current position, which was
continuously updated in response to their movement. The task
was to decide between three colors of doors, then to navigate a
corridor until the doors were reached, and finally to select the
door with the chosen color.
Each trial began with an instruction screen indicating one of
two conditions. In the Instructed condition, participants were
told which door color—red, green or blue—to choose (e.g.,
‘‘Choose green’’). Correctly choosing the instructed door always
resulted in a star. The Voluntary condition asked participants to
choose a color door of their own volition with the cue, ‘‘Find
the star’’. Choice outcomes were not directly indicated but had
to be kept in memory. The participants were explicitly informed
that the outcome for Voluntary trials was random, which allowed
us to create incentive to make the choices while maintaining a
scenario in which each choice was equally likely. Critically, the
doors were not visible at the time participants were instructed to
make their choices, so the choices were made for color and not
for a particular spatial location.
The only restriction to the decision was that participants
were instructed that they were not permitted to make the
same color choice as in the previous trial (however, all choices
were recorded and no error feedback was given if a choice
repetition occurred). This had the advantage that it limited
choice patterns, such as choice repetitions, that could occur with
biases from the previous choice history (Bode et al., 2012; Lages
and Jaworska, 2012). The second advantage was that we could
assess the general task compliance by assessing how many of
these unpermitted choice repetitions occurred. This design also
ensured that participants actively made decisions at the start of
each trial, relying on internal information to make their choice,
and that this process was dissociated from both spatial attention
and motor preparation.
Once a choice was made, participants traveled along the
corridor (phase 1) by holding down a button with their left
hand. At the half-way point in the corridor (phase 2), the
doors at the end of the corridor became visible. Participants
continued traveling down the corridor until they neared the
end, where they could select one of the doors using three
fingers of their right hand matched to the position of the
three colored doors. The locations of each color door (left,
middle, or right) were pseudorandomized each trial. This
ensured that participants could only make their choice based
on color information during phase 1 of the trial, while phase
2 permitted this color choice to then be mapped to the
corresponding action. Importantly, this phase required only
the mapping of the initial color choice to a door location.
If the correct door was chosen in an Instructed trial, or if
the rewarding door was selected in a Voluntary trial, a star
was displayed as well as the total number of stars collected in
the block. If no star was found, only the current count was
displayed.
A fixation cross separated each trial. There was temporal jitter
for the length of the corridor of approximately 4, 8 or 12 s,
depending on the time participants made their door choice, as
well as temporal jitter for the length of the fixation cross between
trials (3, 5 or 7 s) to enable deconvolution of the hemeodynamic
response function (HRF) between the different stages of the trial.
There were five blocks of 36 trials each, consisting of equal
numbers (6 trials) of Instructed/Voluntary × red/green/blue
rewarded doors in a pseudorandomized order.
A brief questionnaire on task strategy was administered to
participants at the end of the session outside the scanner, asking,
‘‘Howmotivated were you to find the stars?’’, ‘‘Do you believe the
stars were randomly hidden?’’, ‘‘Did you use a strategy to find the
stars?’’ and a blank space to detail any specific task strategy that
participants might have used. Participants were also interviewed
verbally to elaborate on any comments on their approach to the
task.
Eyemovements weremeasured using an infrared eye-tracking
device (EyeLink 1000, SR Research Ltd., Kanata, ON, Canada).
For one participant, data could not be collected for technical
reasons. Fixations to the doors were registered for fixation events
that corresponded to pixel regions for each of the three door
locations. These pixel regions for each door were updated for
consecutive 1 s screen viewing intervals, in order to account
for changes in visual perspective while moving in the 3D
environment. The duration of eye fixations to each of the doors
was analyzed in separate time-bins over phase 2 for the Instructed
and Voluntary conditions with a three-way ANOVA. Mauchly’s
Test of Sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity had
been violated (p < 0.001), so a Greenhouse-Geisser correction
was applied.
fMRI Acquisition
MRI volumes of the whole brain were acquired with a
Siemens Trio 3T scanner (Erlangen, Germany) using a standard
32 channel head coil. For each of the five blocks, an average
of 800–900 functional images (depending on speed of task
completion) were acquired using a gradient-echo echo-planar
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm with single trial structure (upper panel) and participant screen views in the virtual environment (lower panel). Each trial began with
an instruction screen. In Instructed trials, this told participants which color door to select, e.g., “Choose green”. In Voluntary trials, participants were told to “Find the
star”, which allowed them to freely choose between either of the two colored doors they had not chosen on the previous trial. Instructed and Voluntary trials were
interspersed to ensure that participants initiated a new decision on each trial. Participants were asked to make their choices at the start of the trial, before proceeding
up a corridor. At the halfway point, the doors became visible and the position of each colored door became apparent. This enabled the participants to initiate motor
preparation to choose the appropriate door at the end of the corridor. Every correct Instructed choice received a star, while stars were pseudorandomly gained in
Voluntary trials. The upper left panel illustrates the different travel times to the halfway point (black to gray bars) and the travel times from halfway point to the door
(dark to light green bars), equivalent to 2, 4, or 6 s. A fixation period separated each trial (jitter represented in black to gray bars).
imaging sequence (GE-EPI) with simultaneous multi-slice
acquisition (multi-band slice acceleration factor = 4, 40 axial
slices, TR = 700 ms, TE = 32.0 ms, FA 60◦, FOV 192 × 192 mm,
voxel size = 3 mm2, slice thickness = 3 mm with 10% slice gap).
A high-resolution T1-weighted structural scan was acquired
(TE = 2.32 ms, TR = 1900 ms, FA = 9◦, FOV 192 × 192 mm,
voxel size = 0.9 mm3). The first 12 s of scans were discarded to
avoid magnetic saturation effects.
Data Pre-Processing
All data was first preprocessed using SPM8 (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, University College London,
London, UK). The images were spatially realigned using a
six-parameter affine transformation to account for effects of head
movement. The T1 structural image was coregistered to themean
of the realigned functional images and then spatially normalized
to MNI space using the segment process of SPM8. These spatial
normalization parameters were then applied to all functional
images, which were then spatially smoothed with a Gaussian
kernel of 8 mm full-width at half-maximum. For multi-voxel
pattern analysis (MVPA), normalization and smoothing were not
conducted at this stage (see below).
Partial Least Squares Analysis
We conducted partial least squares (PLS) analysis to identify
activity in brain regions that subserve Voluntary, as opposed
to Instructed, decisions. This analytical technique is particularly
utilized to extract key features from high-dimensional data
and is robust to individual variations in activity. In this
case, as we expected individual differences in the decision-
making time (and strategy), this technique would best permit
to identify core patterns of activity for Voluntary choices across
all participants. This multivariate technique identifies patterns of
voxel activity across the brain that covary with the experimental
conditions (McIntosh et al., 1996), which results in a set of
latent variables (LV), components that reflect patterns of brain
activity related to the experimental conditions. The LVs are
generated by singular value decomposition of a single matrix
that contains all participants’ data, yielding a singular image
of voxel saliences (i.e., a brain pattern reflecting task-related
changes), a singular profile of task saliences (i.e., the degree
to which each experimental condition contributes to the brain
pattern), and a singular value (i.e., the amount of covariance
accounted for by the LV). We conducted a mean-centering PLS
analysis, using the onsets of the start of the corridor, separating
correct trials only into Instructed and Voluntary conditions, for
a period of 21 TR (corresponding to approximately 15 s of a
hemodynamic response). Significance for each LV was calculated
by a permutation test, which assesses that a singular value
from permuted data (resampled 500 times) is larger than the
obtained value (McIntosh et al., 1996). A second, independent
step was a bootstrap estimation of the standard errors (resampled
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100 times) to determine the reliability of the saliences for the
brain voxels characterizing each pattern identified by the LVs
(Efron and Tibshirani, 1986). A brain score was then calculated
to represent the degree to which the pattern of brain activity
was represented for each participant over each TR. Significance
for the peak voxels was thresholded at a salience to standard
error ratio >3, which is equivalent to p < 0.001 (Sampson et al.,
1989). The regions reported showed activations across multiple
time-points with a peak TR corresponding to approximately
8–10 s, which is displayed using Mango (Research Imaging
Institute, University of Texas Health Science Center at San
Antonio (UTHSCSA), TX, USA). Individual response function
plots are displayed for main ROIs, calculated on BOLD percent
signal change in a peak cluster of 27 voxels averaged over bilateral
ROIs, and separated by condition.
Multi-Voxel Pattern Analysis
MVPA was performed using a customized MVPA Toolbox,
which has been applied in previous work (Bode et al.,
2011, 2013), run in MATLAB in conjunction with SPM8. A
general linear model was first estimated for each individual
participant based on motion corrected, non-normalized,
unsmoothed data to produce parameter estimates for
each voxel in each run per participant across conditions.
Beta images (regressors; condition × block + 6 motion
correction parameters) were estimated for each participant
in separate models, according to the type of decision
category being examined. For the color-choice model, the
estimated beta images corresponded to the start of the
corridor (phase 1): Instructed/Voluntary × red/green/blue.
For the position-choice model, the analysis of interest
included beta images for the halfway point (phase 2):
Instructed/Voluntary × left/middle/right. The same model,
incorporating the location instead of color, was also run for
phase 1 of the trial to check for evidence of potential planning
unrelated to color. A separate set of regressors (of no interest)
accounted for the errors (trials with incorrect responses, missing
responses) in eachmodel. Notable choice biases were observed in
three participants: two demonstrated a strong color preference,
and one demonstrated a strong position preference (fraction of
selections differing by >10% above equal door selection). The
color preferences resulted in unbalanced blocks where one of
the colors was never chosen, so these participants were excluded
from the MVPA color model analysis.
For each model, a three-way searchlight classification
analysis with chance accuracy = 33.3% was conducted on
the parameter estimates (beta images) for each participant
separately (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006). Data for each condition
and each run were extracted from a spherical cluster (3 voxel
radius) centered in turn on each voxel in the brain, and
subsequently transformed into pattern vectors (Soon et al., 2008).
These vectors represented the spatial activation pattern for the
respective experimental conditions from this particular position
in the brain. A five-fold leave-one-out cross-validation procedure
was implemented whereby a linear support vector machine
classifier based on the LibSVM library (Chang and Lin, 2001)
was trained on pattern vectors from all runs but one run, and
then tested on the pattern vectors from the remaining run. In
this way, data from each run was independently used as the test
data set once while training on all other runs (see e.g., Bode
et al., 2013). The average classification accuracy value for the
respective cluster was then assigned to the central voxel. This
procedure was repeated for each cluster in the brain to yield
whole brain classification accuracy maps for each individual for
each classification analysis of interest. To combine data across
individuals, classification accuracy maps were registered to MNI
space by applying the spatial normalization parameters extracted
at the pre-processing stage of the univariate analyses, and
were subsequently smoothed using an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian
kernel. Second-level analysis was performed using SPM8. The
images were entered into a one-sample t-test, with an explicit
SPM brain mask, to identify voxels where classification was
significantly above chance. Significance was determined at voxel-
level p< 0.05, FWE-corrected. Pairwise t-tests were performed to
compare peak decoding accuracy between conditions.
RESULTS
Behavioral Task Performance
For the Instructed choice condition, mean performance, defined
as correctly selecting the instructed colored door, was 97.2%
(SD = 5.2%). For the Voluntary condition, correct performance
was defined as choosing a color that was not the same color as
chosen on the previous trial, and was 94.5% (SD = 4.7%). All
participants but two reported being at least somewhat motivated
to find the stars. Despite being instructed that the allocation
of stars was random, 6/22 participants stated that they believed
that outcomes were not random. Thirteen of 22 participants
reported having used a strategy to choose the doors, and
comments in the open response section indicated a perceived
awareness of having produced some sequence history (14/22)
to establish choice patterns. Comments in the open response
section further indicated that the majority of participants (14/22)
made color-based choices early in the trial, before they reached
the halfway point. A small number (4/22) reported taking into
account the position of doors to finalize their decision, and a
further four participants reported not being aware of having
used any strategy, and having acted randomly (Table 1). An
overview of choice entropy, representing how distributed each
participant’s choices were according to color and position, and
the proportions of colors and positions chosen is provided in
Supplementary Table S1 and Supplementary Figure S1.
Duration of Eye Fixations
A three-way ANOVA with factors door, time period and
condition was conducted on the duration of fixations to the three
doors. The factor of door was categorized as the chosen door,
previous door (disallowed as it was chosen on the previous trial)
and the alternative door for each condition, and was analyzed
over the second phase of the trial when the doors were visible.
The second trial phase was separated further into first and
second half periods of time to examine if differences in fixations
occurred only at the initial viewing or weremaintained over time.
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TABLE 1 | Summary of participant responses from questionnaire provided on task completion.
Questionnaire summary
How motivated were you to find the stars? Not at all Somewhat Very
2 8 12
Do you believe the stars were randomly hidden? Yes No
16 6
Did you use a strategy to find the stars? Yes No
9 13
Open response: strategy Sequential Preference None
14 5 3
Open response: choice basis Color Position Random
14 4 4
We found a significant main effect of time period, indicating
significantly longer fixation durations across all doors in the first
half (M = 290 ms, SE = 13) compared to the second half of phase
2 (M = 176 ms, SE = 13; F(1,20) = 28.60, p < 0.001). There was a
significant main effect of condition, F(1,20) = 21.80, p< 0.001 and
a significant main effect of door choice, but also a significant
interaction between door and condition, F(1.65,33.05) = 4.82,
p = 0.02 (Figure 2). Post hoc tests of this interaction effect
were conducted using paired t-tests (Bonferroni-corrected) to
compare Voluntary vs. Instructed conditions separately for each
door. These showed a significantly longer duration of fixations
to the alternative door in Voluntary decisions than in Instructed
decisions, t(20) = 5.07, p < 0.001. There was a trend towards a
longer duration of fixations to the previous door in Voluntary
trials than Instructed trials, but this did not survive Bonferroni
correction, t(20) = 2.29, p = 0.03. There was no significant
difference in fixation durations to the chosen door between
conditions, t(20) = 0.64, p = 0.5. To check for anticipatory eye
movements, we also examined the total number of fixations to
the screen prior to the doors being visible and found only a trend,
but no significant differences between conditions, t(20) = 1.88,
p = 0.07. There was also no significant difference in target fixation
latency on the chosen door, once visible, between conditions,
t(20) = 1.22, p = 0.2.
FIGURE 2 | Mean duration of fixations on each of the doors for Instructed
(blue) and Voluntary (red) decisions, during the second half of the trial when the
doors were visible. Results of a three-way ANOVA reveal significant differences
in fixation duration to the three doors between conditions (p < 0.001). The
time spent fixating on the chosen door and previous door did not differ
between conditions but time spent fixating on the alternative door, which was
still available to choose, was greater in Voluntary trials (∗∗∗p < 0.001).
PLS Whole-Brain Networks
The PLS analysis for two conditions at the start of the trial onset
permitted only one LV, which was found to be significant (100%
of model variance, p < 0.001), and differentiated Voluntary
from Instructed decisions (Figures 3A,B). It is important to note
that regions of activity for each condition reflect voxel activity
that covaries with the onset of either a Voluntary or Instructed
trial. Therefore, activity in the ‘‘positive’’ network identifies a
whole-brain network that is more active for Voluntary decisions,
whereas the ‘‘negative’’ network includes regions more active
for Instructed decisions. In the Voluntary condition, there was
widespread engagement of regions of the frontoparietal network,
including the ACC, extending through to the supplementary
motor areas (SMA), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC),
including the inferior and middle frontal gyri (IFG/MFG), and
IPL. Activity in the bilateral insular cortices was also associated
with Voluntary decision trials. Instructed trials were associated
with a relative increase in activity in the medial prefrontal cortex
and posterior cingulate cortex.
MVPA Predictive Choice Patterns
We analyzed the neural representation of color choice at both
the start and halfway points of the trial but did not find
significant clusters in either Voluntary or Instructed conditions.
Sub-threshold clusters were, however, evident in the visual cortex
at the start of the trial, at an uncorrected significance threshold
(p < 0.001) with peak MNI coordinates at [−15 −79 10]
when color conditions were combined across Voluntary and
Instructed trials. No above-chance decoding of the door position
was found at the start of the trial, confirming that participants
were not relying on the position information available later in
the trial to make their choices. At the halfway point, in both
Instructed and Voluntary conditions, the choice corresponding
to the position of the door could be decoded significantly
above chance in a cluster including the left primary motor
and somatosensory regions (Figure 4). The classifier accuracy
was 64% for Instructed choice and 60% for Voluntary choice,
corresponding to 31% and 27% above chance, respectively
(peak MNI coordinates: Instructed [−42 −25 58], Voluntary
[−42 −28 58], p < 0.05 FWE-corrected). A second cluster
in the visual cortex also contained discriminatory information,
with classification accuracy of 62% for Instructed choice and
51% for Voluntary choice (peak MNI coordinates: Instructed
[9 −82 13], Voluntary [15 −82 16], p < 0.05 FWE-corrected).
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FIGURE 3 | Partial least squares (PLS) analysis separates networks of regions
where activations covaried with the onset of Voluntary decisions (red) and
Instructed decisions (blue) at the start of the trial. (A) For Voluntary decisions,
regions of the frontoparietal and salience networks were active, including the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), supplementary motor area, bilateral
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), inferior parietal lobes (IPL) and insular
cortices. Instructed decisions engaged a separate network, with activation
predominantly in the medial prefrontal cortex. Results are thresholded at a
bootstrap ratio (BSR) of 3 and displayed using Mango (Research Imaging
Institute, UTHSCSA). (B) Mean brain scores of the LV1 pattern (p < 0.001)
across the entire brain of each participant for Voluntary (red) and Instructed
(blue) decisions over 21 TR scans (TR = 0.7 s; equivalent to 15 s of a
hemeodynamic response) shows a functional differentiation between
conditions. Note that the “negative” brain score here for Instructed decisions
indicates that this network was dissociated from Voluntary decision activity,
and does not represent deactivation.
Decoding accuracy in the visual cortex was significantly higher in
the Instructed condition compared to the Voluntary condition,
t(21) = 5.238, p < 0.001. Decoding accuracy in the motor cortex
did not differ significantly between conditions but showed a
similar trend, t(21) = 1.828, p = 0.08.
DISCUSSION
Our findings reveal new insight into voluntary decision-making
in a dynamic task environment, starting from initial intention to
action execution. Using PLS, we show that regions corresponding
to the frontoparietal and salience networks were activated when
participants freely made their own choices rather than when
they were instructed which door to choose. This activity was
evident from the start of the trial, prior to any visual stimuli
revealing the position of the doors ahead. Notably, this finding
suggests that the neural activity during this proactive period
reflected choice selection, a central process of voluntary decision-
making, rather than any additional demands from attentional
selection or motor preparation. Decoding of the specific color
choice was not possible in either condition, but we found robust
decoding of the motor choice from the time that the door
positions became visible. During this later period of motor
preparation, we also found that participants fixated longer on the
alternative doors when their choice was freely made than when
instructed. Together, these findings raise the possibility that
proactive preparation of voluntary decisions engages ongoing
demands on choice selection and maintenance, which might be
more effortful for voluntary decisions as alternatives continue to
be considered.
Results of this study provide support for a central role of the
frontoparietal network in proactive voluntary choice selection.
Regions of the frontoparietal network have been commonly
associated with voluntary decisions, which require selection
between multiple options (Lau et al., 2004b; Turk et al., 2004;
Walton et al., 2004; Nachev et al., 2005; Rowe et al., 2005;
Thimm et al., 2012). Thimm et al. (2012) proposed that the
frontoparietal network may function as a free choice network
that is recruited independent of modality, based on findings
that perceptual and not only motor tasks recruited this network.
FIGURE 4 | (A) Areas in which a searchlight analysis revealed significant decoding of the door position participants were preparing to choose (left, middle or right) in
corridor task phase 2 (when the doors became visible). The t-score represents the group-level significance of decoding. Decoding accuracy was highest across
conditions in the left motor cortex, but a second cluster in the visual cortex also contained discriminatory information (p < 0.05 FWE-corrected). Results are
presented on a 3D-rendered standard brain template with Mango, thresholded at p < 0.001 for ease of viewing. (B) Decoding accuracy in the peak coordinates from
(A) based on the position participants were preparing to select, separated by region and condition (Instructed in blue; Voluntary in red). The line represents chance
accuracy (33%). In the left motor cortex, there is a trend towards higher decoding in the Instructed condition and in the visual cortex this difference is highly
statistically significant (∗∗∗p < 0.001). The horizontal line depicts chance accuracy (33%).
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Our study extends this proposal by finding recruitment of
the frontoparietal network during a proactive decision-making
period, separate from spatial attention processes or conflict
between competing action plans, both of which are known to
recruit the frontoparietal network (Scolari et al., 2015). This
interpretation is also in line with other findings showing the
involvement of the frontoparietal network when intentions had
to be kept in memory before execution, in particular during the
storage period (Gilbert, 2011; Gilbert et al., 2011). As in our
study, the same network did not necessarily encode the outcome
of the decision (Gilbert, 2011).
Frontoparietal activity has been found to scale with the
amount of cognitive control required by tasks and, in particular,
the amount of uncertainty within a decision (Fan, 2014; Fan
et al., 2014). The common recruitment of this network during
voluntary decisions is thought to result from the greater demand
on selection processes required when choosing between multiple
options, compared to simple goal maintenance for instructed
choices (Frith et al., 1991; Hadland et al., 2001; Bunge et al., 2002;
Leotti and Delgado, 2011; Thimm et al., 2012; Duncan, 2013).
The DLPFC in particular has been suggested to be a central node
of a higher order free choice network that is recruited to enable
free selection among alternatives (Rowe et al., 2005; Thimm
et al., 2012), both for rules and for actions (Rowe et al., 2008).
However, in previous studies on DLPFC activation, it has not
been possible to dissociate the effects of choice selection from the
effects of motor processing (Curtis and D’Esposito, 2003). Our
finding of DLPFC activity for voluntary mental color selection at
a time preceding motor preparation provides good evidence for
its role in free choice selection. The pre-SMA, another region,
which has been commonly associated with voluntary choices
acrossmodalities (Cunnington et al., 2002, 2005; Lau et al., 2004a;
Rowe et al., 2008; Taylor et al., 2008; Thimm et al., 2012), was
also recruited for voluntary choice trials. In accordance with
these previous studies, activity of the DLPFC and pre-SMA are
indicative of choice selection occurring for voluntary decisions
during this proactive period.
Furthermore, we found activity of the ACC, which has
previously been found to be more activated for voluntary
decisions than forced, or specified, decisions (Lau et al., 2004b;
Walton et al., 2004; Forstmann et al., 2006). Some have suggested
that activity in this region relates specifically to conflict between
motor plans in related tasks (Thimm et al., 2012). However,
recruitment of the ACC at a time preceding action preparation
suggest a role related more broadly to information processing.
One theory suggests that the ACC routes information on the
basis of information content, or uncertainty, which in this case
would relate to the higher number of options to compare and
choose between in the voluntary trials compared to instructed
trials (Fan, 2014). Another possibility is that ACC activation in
this task may have been related to its role in conflict monitoring
(Botvinick, 2007), as the restriction of choice options based on
the previous choice required conflict resolution to inhibit the
option that could not be chosen on that trial. Although conflict
is arguably inevitable when choosing between highly similar
options, as in most free choice tasks, there is some evidence
that conflict and free choice selection engage different regions of
the ACC (Nachev et al., 2005). Activation in our study cannot
distinguish between the two.
The ACC together with the insula also forms a salience
network responsible for detecting informative stimuli (Seeley
et al., 2007; Menon and Uddin, 2010). The bilateral insula are
a hub that integrate internal and perceptual inputs, which are
then directed for attentional processing and goal-directed activity
(Menon and Uddin, 2010). Similar to the ACC, the insula is
also modulated by uncertainty in the expected choice outcomes
(Critchley et al., 2001; Knutson and Greer, 2008; Mohr et al.,
2010). Previous studies have found greater activation of this area
for preference-based decisions over externally-dictated choices
(Paulus and Frank, 2003; Turk et al., 2004). In addition to the
anticipation of positive outcomes, the insula have been found
to be activated preceding uncertain losses, which suggests that
this network may be activated in arousal in general (Knutson
and Greer, 2008). Our finding of salience network activity may
be related to participants’ uncertain expectation of receiving a
star from their choice. It has also been suggested that salience
network activity is likely to be important during embodied
decisions, where activity could enable switching between the
various sources of information (Seeley et al., 2007). In our study,
participants needed to attend to information related to color
preference and value expectation as well as the upcoming visual
cues in the virtual environment.
Although participant choices led to random reward outcomes,
it is likely that the recent reward history influenced the
expectations of the optimal choice for participants to make
(Leotti and Delgado, 2011; Pezzulo andOgnibene, 2012; Haggard
and Eitam, 2015). The tendency to see patterns in random events
is well documented, and might have led to more systematic
response patterns and strategies (Guth and Frankmann, 1965;
Tricomi et al., 2004; Whitson and Galinsky, 2008; Yu and
Cohen, 2008; Lages and Jaworska, 2012). We aimed to minimize
these effects by disallowing repetition of the previous choice
(Soon et al., 2008, 2014; Lages and Jaworska, 2012; Allefeld
et al., 2013; Lages et al., 2013; Bode et al., 2014) and by clearly
instructing participants that the distribution of stars was random.
Nevertheless, a substantial proportion of participants suspected
that the stars were not random, in line with previous reports
that participants demonstrate the use of strategies when faced
with random outcomes (Tricomi et al., 2004). Interestingly,
these effects have been found to be enhanced when individuals
perceive a lack of control (Whitson and Galinsky, 2008),
which could have occurred in our task due to the inability to
predict where the stars were hidden. It appears that even when
individuals are aware that the environment is stochastic, given
the freedom to choose, there is a tendency to track the statistical
properties of the environment in order to try to optimize choice
outcomes.
To what extent people engaged in such strategies was not
directly investigated but the motivational value of finding the
stars is likely to have differed between individuals in our
study. The nature of the decision process and brain regions
implicated might therefore have varied to some extent as well.
Our use of PLS was designed to identify common networks
activated, but it is possible that some individuals recruited
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a more extended decision-making network, engaging regions
for strategic control or anticipatory reward processing. While
these questions could be addressed in future work explicitly
manipulating the probabilities of finding rewards or encouraging
specific strategies, it should also be noted that in many real-life
situations people likely employ individual strategies to guide their
voluntary decisions.
With this study, we also sought to determine if it was possible
to predict voluntary decisions in a more complex decision-
making context. Surprisingly, we could not predict the decisions
based on color choice at any point in the trial. This was true
for voluntary as well as instructed trials, where participants
necessarily had a color in mind. These results may be due
to a lack of sensitivity in decoding, as subthreshold clusters
in the visual cortex were evident at the start of the trial
and color choices could be decoded (albeit at an uncorrected
threshold) when voluntary and Instructed trials were analyzed
together. Furthermore, the participants’ near-perfect accuracy
in appropriately selecting one of the available color doors
and the absence of position decoding in the first trial phase
provide strong evidence that participants did indeed make initial
decisions based on color. Once the doors became visible and
initial color choices could be mapped onto positions to generate
action choices, we found robust decoding for the position of the
door participants were preparing to choose. The cluster in the
left motor cortex most likely reflects preparatory motor plans
differentiating between the fingers associated with selecting the
left, middle or right doors. Finger-specific action plans have
been reported in other modalities (Quandt et al., 2012). A
second cluster in the visual cortex most likely indicates visual
attention as participants fixated for longer on the door of
choice.
In contrast to previous reports, we did not observe
information predicting the decision outcomes in the
frontoparietal network (Soon et al., 2008, 2013), nor in
medial and lateral prefrontal cortex (Haynes et al., 2007),
even though PLS analysis found this network to be highly
activated for voluntary choices. It is possible that although these
regions were involved in information processing, the content
of the specific choices was encoded in separate regions. This
dissociation between information encoding and retrieval has
previously been reported for delayed intentions (Gilbert, 2011).
However, it can be noted that, as the door associated with
reward changed throughout the experiment, according to the
pseudorandom receipt of stars, the only constant distinguishing
features between doors were color and position. Higher-order
decision factors may have been averaged across trials as the
perception of the optimal door to choose changed. We also
did not find frontopolar cortex activity to be predictive of
decisions outcomes. It has been proposed that this region
mediates cognitive branching between options that are held in
the background (Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007), for example in a
delayed intention (Gilbert, 2011) or sequential choice scenario
(Soon et al., 2008). As we tried to minimize the reliance of choice
on statistical tracking, with each trial requiring a new decision
to be made after the cue, we expected less involvement of this
region. Importantly, during the second task phase, higher-level
planning areas may not have been predictive of the decisions, as
participants were already able to transform their initial choices
into action plans at this point.
Interestingly, we found that decoding was slightly lower in
the motor cortex and significantly lower in the visual cortex
for voluntary decisions as compared to instructed decisions.
Patterns of eye fixations may provide some explanation for
this finding. There was a systematic and significant difference
in the duration of fixations between conditions as participants
approached the doors: fixations to the chosen door were equal
between conditions, but in voluntary trials the duration of
fixations to the alternative available door throughout this period
was longer. One possibility is that our neural findings may
relate to a feature of voluntary decisions that would usually
be overlooked in conventional, non-dynamic tasks: namely,
individuals may continue to consider their available options
throughout the time leading up to a decision. This freedom
of choice could lead to more proactive visual exploration of
the alternative option, as well as formation of a less stable
choice representation, which may explain the weaker decoding
of decision outcomes that we found in voluntary trials. Fixations
to visual stimuli have been shown to influence upcoming
decisions (Krajbich et al., 2010; Pezzulo and Ognibene, 2012),
and ongoing consideration of the alternative door may reflect
efforts to resolve uncertainty in deciding which door to select.
However, it might also be that an inherent feature of voluntary
decisions is to ‘‘keep one’s options open’’ (Klyubin et al.,
2005).
In summary, we show that voluntary decisions were
associated with activity of the frontoparietal network and
salience network during a proactive decision period from
intention formation to final action selection. We also find
that the specific upcoming choice could be decoded from
patterns of activity relating to motor preparation once the
specific location of the selected door was known. This was
evident in both motor and visual cortices in both conditions,
although with lower decoding accuracy for voluntary decisions
than the instructed decisions. Eye fixations further suggested
that participants engaged more with the alternative door
throughout the decision period when they were free to choose.
These results suggest that free decisions recruit networks
for choice selection in preparation for a decision, and that
neural representations at this time reflect ongoing proactive
processes relevant for decision-making and maintenance
of voluntary decisions. Differences in engagement with
the environment raise the possibility that during voluntary
decisions individuals may hold choice options in a more
active state during proactive preparation. Our study therefore
constitutes an important step towards a better understanding
of how decisions are made in more realistic ecological
environments.
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